When Boeing announced last week that it has received a $378 million contract to accelerate production of satellite-guided bombs for the Air Force and Navy, it was a sure sign of the Bush administration's seriousness about preparing for a major war with Iraq. But the Boeing contract also suggests that the administration has neither a clear war-fighting strategy nor a firm timetable.

Boeing's satellite-guided bomb is called the Joint Direct Attack Munition, or JDAM. It was developed after the 1991 Gulf War, when unexpected rainy weather in Iraq wreaked havoc with U.S. laser-guided bombs. Rain and humidity disrupted the laser beams and made it more difficult for pilots to establish a "lock" on their targets.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that an all-weather guided weapon was the most important weapons innovation that came out of the Gulf War. The new JDAMs, guided by Global Positioning System satellites, were used for the first time in the NATO war in Yugoslavia in 1999. While the JDAM was slightly less accurate than laser-guided bombs under ideal conditions (capable of hitting within 30 feet of its target vs. 10 feet for the laser guided bombs), the new weapon proved reliable and deadly on the battlefield.

Weapons analysts also soon noticed that the failures of JDAMs were less severe than those of laser-guided bombs. When JDAMs missed, they usually fell within 150 feet of their "aim point." When the laser-guided bombs missed, they could land hundreds, if not thousands, of feet from their targets. The new JDAM could also be produced for less than $25,000 each--a tenth of the $250,000 price tag for the newest and most accurate laser-guided bomb.

The JDAM proved popular with U.S. commanders during the war in Yugoslavia-almost too popular. B-2 bombers dropped 700 JDAMs on Serbian targets, using up virtually the entire inventory of the new weapons. Had the war lasted longer, the lack of JDAMs would have soon limited the U.S.'s ability to launch strikes in all kinds of weather, particularly from the B-2 bomber. Seeking to prevent such shortages from occurring again, the Pentagon in 2000 boosted JDAM production to about 8,900 per year.

Now the Pentagon wants even more. Boeing's new contract will increase production to some 2,800 per month or 33,600 per year. Ultimately, this will increase the JDAM inventory to close to a quarter million, according to the trade newsletter Defense Daily.

But right now, the inventory is less than 20,000 worldwide, a fact that is central to U.S. preparations for war in Iraq. Air Force sources insist that the inventory of JDAMs, as well as laser-guided bombs, and their deployment in the right locations, is one of the major factors limiting the U.S. ability to fight a war in Iraq right now. To some, the inventory simply needs to be built up like a volunteer fire department fundraising campaign: when the goal is reached, victory is complete. Others, though, see a danger in designing a war on the basis of the inventory, rather than following a strategy that is not constrained by how many weapons, or what types, are available.

The example of the Afghan war suggests caution is in order. Some 6,000 JDAMs have been used in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan since last October 7. No one anticipated that so many of these guided weapons (together with another 6,000 plus laser-guided bombs) would be used.